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  1 The Hollowing Out and Internationalization of the Capital 
   Markets 
 This paper investigates the hollowing out of the capital markets in 
Japan and the change in the nature of fund raising by Japanese companies 
since 1990. 
 In 1980s, the capital markets moved towards deregulation and the 
international security investment greatly increased between developed 
countries. The financial and capital markets were also affected by the 
increased securitization of finance, and during this period financial compe-
tition grew stronger in the markets of each country. 
 These developments in financial mechanisms are based on the interna-
tionalization of business, especially, the global competition between multi-
national enterprises, and multinational financial institutions, which in-
vested funds on the cross border basis, and which have practiced inter-
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penetration on the foreign direct investment. 
  It is important for understanding the trend towards internationalization 
to note that multinational enterprises and multinational banks , which 
have been growing after the establishment of EEC in 1958 , developed 
various kinds of financial innovation in the Euro markets , such as the 
concept of floating rate, derivatives, FRN , and Swap transactions. In 
addition, they have transmitted those innovations to the domestic market 
of each country. 
  Japanese companies also diversified their sources for raising funds , and 
this resulted in the high ratio of direct financing in their capital composi -
tion. 
  However, since 1990, Japanese economy , thus far, remains in recession 
and is prevented from going up from the bottom because of the sharp 
contraction of corporate stock markets in 1990 . 
  As Japanese economic growth and capital equipment investment in 
1980s were sustained by the prosperity of the stock market giving high 
stock prices and with low cost equity finance for companies , the decline of 
share prices and the contraction of the securities markets after the burst-
ing of the bubble economy in 1990 entrapped the economic and business 
conditions in a state of depression. This was because business manage-
ment and its financial activities depended excessively on hidden assets 
and fictitious capital generation in the securities markets . 
 We now have to discuss whether the Japanese capital markets have 
"hollowed out" in tho
se circumstances. We consider that the hollowing out 
occurs in conditions of advancing internationalization , and it is an inevita-
ble phenomenon when this proceeded. 
 Firstly, we look at the trends in international security investment in 
Japan.
(282)
The Hollowing out of the Capital Markets and the Corporate Financing 
in Japan 
      Figure 1 Securities Investment in JAPAN
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Source : TSE, Fact Book 1995, pp. 93 and 95.
 Figures 1 shows the in-out security investment in Japan. Foreign invest-
ment in Japanese securities increased after the stock price decrease of 1990. 
and foreign investors preferred to invest more in stocks than bonds. It is 
reason why the stock price dropped to a reasonable price for foreign 
investors who have expected the growth of corporate Japan. 
 Net balance (purchases) of Japanese stock by foreign investors in 1990 
increased by  2,723  billion yen to 4,866  billion yen. Foreign investors 
wanted to get assets denominated yen, under the rising yen, and furthre-
more, this proceeded the international diversification of investment. 
 On the other hand, Japanese investment in foreign securities has always 
included more bonds than stocks because Japanese investors, mainly
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institutional investors, purchased the euro yen bonds issued by foreign 
governments and relatived agencies or by Japanese companies who 
wished to avoid foreign exchange risk. It seems that the hollowing out of 
the capital markets in Japan is related to market problems involving euro 
yen bonds and domestic bonds. 
  The problems of "hollowing out" in the capital market which is dis -
cussed in Japan can be summed up in the three points given below ; 
(1) Some foreign companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange with-
drew their listing and moved to the Asian capital markets , such as Hong 
Kong, Singapore. 
  (2) Asian capital markets emerged quickly and two years ago , big 
Chinese companies were listed on the New York Stock Exchange by 
passing the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
 (3) Japan's stock trading is increasing on the London market (SEAQ 
international). In addition, it is said that the euro yen bond market has 
developed more rapidly than the domestic bond markets in Japan . 
    Table 1 Number of Listed Companies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
      1985 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Domestic 1476 1499 1532 1571 1597 1627 1641 1651 1667 1689 
Foreign 21 52 88 112 119 125 125 119 110 93 
Source : Toushou Youran Fact Book, Tokyo Stock Exchange, Various Years. 
 As Table 1 shows, in 1990 and 1991, the listed number of foreign 
companies were record high of 125. Although Tokyo foreign stock market 
was established in December 1973 and has been developed by gradual 
process of deregulation, some foreign companies decided to end their 
listing after 1990 and 1991 because of depressing stock market condition 
and the decline in the number of shareholders. As a result , the number of 
listed foreign companies eventually decreased to 93 in 1994.
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 Further, American companies as General Electric, Amex, Ford Mortors, 
Allied Signal, announced their departure from the Tokyo stock market, 
and ended their listing on June 1995, and the number of foreign listing 
eventually fell to 83 in June this year (For these see Nihon Keizai newspaper, 
25th March 1995). 
 The reason of their withdrawal are all related to the declining volume of 
stock trading and that the listing fee is a considerable burden on listed 
foreign companies. Also, it costs a great to make the documents for 
negotiable securities available in Japanese. Those foreign company's delis-
ting on the Tokyo stock market were accepted by the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange which aimed to create an international financial center, as a 
decline of its position in Asia, and also it is held that it will be serious affair 
if the Tokyo market becomes merely a local or regional market. 
          Table 2 Comparison of Stock Exchange (End of 1993) 
   Stock Exchange TokyoNYLondon German Hong Kong Singapore 
No. of  Stock  (domestic) 1,667 (1,641) 2,208  1, 865 409 450 (332) 208 (157) 
Listed Co. (Foreign) 110 (125)153 547 345 27 (25) 27 (26) 
No. of Listed Issues 
Stocks (domestic) 1,667(1,650) 2,711  1, 993 504 450 (344) 244 (162) 
          (foreign) 110 (125)193 6921 360 39(24) 32 (27) 













































 Note  ; Numbers of Tokyo, Hong kong, Singapore in Parenthesis are No. in 1991. 
 Source ; Data are from Toushou Youran Fact Book, 1993 & 1995, Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
 Table 2 shows that the listed number of foreign companies in the Asian 
market is growing. We should notice that bond markets in Hong Kong and 
Singapore markedly increased the number of foreign listings. In addition 
to those circumstances, two Chinese enterprises, such as Shanhai Sekiyu 
Kako in July 1993 and Santon Kanou Hatsuden in August 1994, listed on
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the New York Stock Exchange but not on the Tokyo market . 
  But it appears to us that the above factors are not always leading to 
hollowing out. We may put the points briefly as follow . 
  Speaking about points 1 and 2, firstly, foreign companies' delisting on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange was caused by the lingering depression in the 
Tokyo stock market. It will be able to solve the problem if the market in 
Japan recovers from the recent low levels. It is natural for China to prefer 
the New York capital market with its largest scale for fund raising for 
Chinese companies. 
  Simultaneously, at the present, the Singapore government introduced a 
new tax treatment to stimulating inward investment from foreign coun -
tries, and gave preferential treatment in the form of tax exemption for a 
non-resident who received dividends in Singapore . 
  It will be understood that markets closely inter-related , and at present, 
financial competition has become stronger between Japan and the DAES 
(Dynamic Asian Economies). 
 Finally, the third point is as follow ; 
 Japanese stock trading on the London market (SEAQ International) 
increased to 13 trillion yen in 1994, compared with 10 trillion in 1990. It is 
considered that this increase does not mean the hollowing out of the 
Japanese stock market. The amount of foreign trading of Japan's stocks on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange simultaneously increased since 1990
, and 
increased to about 33 trillion yen in 1994 (Koizumi , R. [2], pp. 58-59.). It is, 
therefore, concluded that the increase of Japan's stock trading on London 
market may be related to the growth of foreigner's investment into the 
Japanese stock in Tokyo. 
 At the present, foreign institutional investors have especially diversified 
their investments internationally, and invested more in Japanese stocks in
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Japan. We must notice that the increase of Japan's stock trading on the 
London market is attracted by the purchase of stock of foreign investors 
on the Tokyo stock market. Therefore, it is not necessarily to be seem as 
a hollowing out phenomenon in Japan. 
 However it is possible to say that if euro yen bonds markets are growing 
more rapidly, domestic bonds markets inclusive of Samurai bonds will 
suffer from the hollowing out. To protect from hollowing out, it is neces-
sary to review the issuing fees and the guideline relative to the bond 
issues, and relax the regulations on bond markets in Japan. 
      Table 3 Overall volume of borrowing facilities $ billion 
                   Tr,ctriiman+c 
                




Committed back-up facilities 7.0(0.1) 7.7
A. Total securities & facilities 368.7(57.1)455.8
ECP programmes48.3 (5.9) 35.9
 utcatea i s 
 mitted ck-up ilities7.0(0.1) . (0.2) ' 6.7(-) 8.2( -) 4.9( ) 
. tal cur ties  ilities 8.7(57.1)455.8(72.3)481.8(57.1)666.6(61.9)679.6(39.3) 
  ra mes48.3 ) .  (7.1) 28.9 (2.6) 38.4 (1.0) 31.8 (2.7) 
 MTEN programmes17.9(1.1) 44.3(4.4) 99.0(15.8)113.6(22.4) 243.1(31 .2)' 
B. Total uncommitted borrowing 66,2(7.0) 80.2 (11 .5) 127.9 (18.4)152.0 (23.4) 274.9 (33.9) 
 GRAND TOTAL (A + B) '434.9(64.1)536.0(83.8)609.7(75.5)818.6(85.3)954.5(73.2) 
Note Note ; Numbers in parenthesis are volume of Japan. 
 Source ; Data are caluculated from Financial Market Trends(60), February 1995. 
 Table 3 describes the instruments of financing in the international 
financial and capital markets. It is clear that the grand total increased by 
17 percent from previous years, to the historical high of 955 billion dollars 
in 1994. The numbers in parenthesis show the amount of Japanese offer-
ings. Japan has mainly offered securities in terms of bonds, and has 
occupied a high market share of convertible bond and bond with warrant 
in those markets. 
 Table 4 shows a Japanese percentage of instruments of financing on 
every year in those markets. As Japanese stock price was high during the
__ 1
9 2 1993 1994
1) 333.7(56.2) 481.0(61.0) 426.9(38.5)
23.5 40.7 44.9
117.9(0.9) 136.7(0.9) 202.8(0.8)
 6.7(  ) 8.2( ._.) 4.9( )
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Table 4 Rate of Japanese Financing in the international Capital and 
   Financial Market(%)
Ins truments 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Straight Bonds 
 Convertible Bonds 
 Warrant Bonds 
 Floating Rate Note 
 Stocks 
 Syndicated Credits 
 ECP programmes 





















































Note ; Numbers are Rate of every years and instruments . 
Source; Culculated from data in Financial Market Trends (60), February 1995. 
bubble economy until 1990 , large proportion of equities related bonds were 
issued by Japan, and attracted many investors to those bonds due to link 
with Japan's high stock price . In the next section, we examine the Japanese 
financing by bonds issues in the international capital market , as we saw 
already on figure 1 that Japanese have invested much earlier in overseas 
issued bonds.
2 Corporate Financing and Deregulations
  It was discussed earlier that an increase of yen denominated euro bonds 
hollow out the Japanese domestic bonds markets . To prove it, we analize 
the financing of Japanese listed companies in domestic and foreign mar -
kets since 1990. 
 Firstly, on the domestic market , in 1994, a total of funds raised amounted 
to 6,583  billion yen, to 77 .5 percent in the grand total , although straight 
bond issues have much decreased . Because the stock market has modestly 
improved and investors shifted to convertible bonds . Accordingly, as a lot 
of issues of convertible bond and stock covered the decrease of straight
  (276) TheinHollowing out of the Capital Markets and the Corporate Financing 125   Japan 
bond, the sum of funds raised increased. It is the reason why at that time, 
investors expected that the national economy and corporate performance 
can recover because the environments for bonds issues were in good order 
and they could issued convertible bonds at below 1 percent. 
 Secondly, on the foreign market, as Table 5 described, the rate of foreign 
financing increased remarkably, more than 60 percent beyond the domes-
tic market in 1991 and 1992. However, in 1994, the amount of funds raised 
on the foreign market decreased to 22.5 percent and to  1,916 billion yen, 
from 5,020  billion yen of previous year. The reason why Japanese bond 
issue overseas decreased, is that Japanese companies returned to the 
national market. That is to say, Japanese companies preferred to issue 
bonds in the national market that was reformed by the relaxation of 
criterion for eligible bonds and a low interest well below 1 percent.
Table 5 Financing of Domestic listed companies in Japan
 1991
A. Domestic Market 927 .2 63. 7
Straight bonds 182 .8 12. 6
Convertible bonds 272 .7 18. 7
Warrant bonds 92 .5 6. 4
Stock 379 .2 26. 0
B. Foreign Market 529 .2 36. 3
Straight bonds 147 .3 10. 1
Convertible bonds 77 .1 5. 3
Warrant bonds 292 .5 20. l
Stock 12 .3 0. 81
GRAND TOTAL(A +B) 1456 .4 100
             90 % 1991 % 1992 % 1993 
estic arket 927.2 63.7 456.7 36.5 383.1 39.8 612.4 
traight nds 182.8 12.6 231.5 18.5 289.4 30.1 368.4 
nvertible nds 272.7 18.7 106.2 8.5  51.7 5.4 161.7 
a rant nds92.5 6.4 38.2 3.1 0 0  0 
tock379.2 26.0 80.8 61.4 42.0 4.4 82.3 
reign arket 9.  36.3 793.5 63.5 578.9 60.2 502.0 
traight nds 7.  10.1 376.7 30.1 376.7 39.2 F 276.8 
nvertible nds 77.1 5.3 24.5 2.0 34.5 3.6 40.0 
a rant nds292.5 20.1 392.3 31.4 167.7 17.4 185.2 
tock12.3 0.8 0 0,1 0 0 0 
D L(A - -B) 56.4 100 1250.2 100 962.0 100 114.4 
Note; numbers of Stock included volume of Exercise of Warrants. 
Source ; Culculated from data in Shouken Toukei Nenpou, 1994, p. 134.
Y10 billion
 1994
55 .0 658 .3 77 5
33 .1 292 .0 34 4
14 .5 272 .7 32 1
0 0 0
7 .4 93 .6 11 0
45 .0 191 .6 22 5
 24.8 75.4 
3.6 25.9 
16.6 90.3 






 However, the amount of funds raised by Japanese companies in foreign 
securities markets has gradually increased since 1990, except for 1994. 
What the Table 5 makes clear is that Japanese companies issued external 
bonds in yen, such as foreign bonds and euro bonds, but have hardly
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issued stock. Also, bonds with warrant are always issued overseas
, while 
few are issued in national market . The increase of bonds with warrants 
issued by Japanese companies in foreign markets indicates that the such 
bonds have effective means of hedging foreign exchange risks for Japa -
nese companies, which have a lot of assets overseas under the rising yen . 
            Table 6 External bonds issues in yen1( billion
 Foreign issues in tokyo 
 Euro-yen bonds 
  (Non Resident) 
  (Japan) 
TOTAL 
  (of which : by LDCs)































Source ; Culculated from data in Financial Market Trends(60), p. 66. 
  Table 6 gives the external bond issues in yen , and a comparison of 
foreign issues in Tokyo(Samurai bond) and euro yen bond . The govern-
ments and agencies, large companies of each country actively issued yen 
denominated bonds in the foreign and national markets in accordance 
with the development of the internationalization of the yen . Foreign issues 
in Tokyo that are bonds in yen issued by non-residents , namely Samurai 
bond, increased from 1991. The reason why Samurai bond issues increased 
is that it could be issued at a low interest , as compared with the interest of 
other developed countries, although Japan's long term interest were on an 
upward trend until September 1994. But Samurai bonds then decreased by 
596 billion yen from previous year , to 1,123 billion yen in 1994. The reason 
for this is that as the Samurai bond issued by sovereign countries , like 
Sweden and Finland, was in a large quantity in 1993. it appeared a reaction 
in 1994 (Ueda, Y.[13], p. 2). 
 The important point to note about the hollowing out is that the euro yen
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bond issued by foreigners and Japanese became large recently, and each 
amount of these bonds were always much more than Samurai bonds. 
 As we have seen on the Table 6, the volume of euro yen bond issues has 
remarkably doubled from  3,268  billion yen in 1990 to record high of 6,789 
                                                          billion yen in 1994 due to a great demand for yen. This increase was based 
on non-resident issues of 5,395  billion yen in 1994, twice as much as 
previous year. 
  There are mainly two reasons behind growth of euro yen bonds mar-
kets. First, although Japanese government has prohibited a primary sale 
into Japan during the 90 day after the euro yen bonds were issued, but on 
1st January 1994, the Ministry of Finance in Japan removed the 90 day 
"lock -up" for euro yen bonds issued by foreign sovereign borrowers and 
their agencies in order to correspond with the internationalization of the 
yen, but it remained for domestic companies. This lifting of 90 day 
"lock -up" must have stimulated the issues of euro yen bonds. Second, it is 
clear that the Japanese institutional investors recomposed their portfolios 
towards yen denominated bonds in order to avoid foreign exchange risks 
under the appreciation of the yen. In addition to this, the important thing 
is that the euro yen bond markets are more favorable than Samurai and 
domestic markets because of low commission rates, a smooth issue proce-
dures, and the market liquidity for bonds. In other words, the problem is 
that the Tokyo markets involve such obstacles which should have seem 
 removed. 
           Table 7 External bonds issues of JapanY 10 billion
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Overseas bond issues 
Euro yen issues 











Source : Culculated from Financial Market Trends (60) and Shauken Toukei Nenpou, 1994.
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  Table 7 shows a rate and an amount of euro yen bond issued by Japan 
in the external bonds issues . A rate of euro yen bond issued continued to 
grow every year, to 72.8 percent in 1994. Of course, this is the reason why 
overseas bond issues of Japan declined to 1 ,916 billion yen. But even so, as 
a rate of euro yen bond issues increased beyond 50 percent
, against the 
overseas bond issues since 1993 , it is clear that foreign financing of 
Japanese companies has a tendency to concentrate on euro yen bond 
issues. 
 And so, continuously, Table 8 draws a comparison of the domestic bond 
issues and euro yen bond issued by Japanese . Especially, a rate of euro yen 
bond issues of Japan against the domestic bond issues is extremely high
, 
over 50 percent during 1991 and 1993 . Judging from this, we can recognize 
a phenomenon of the hollowing out in the Japanese bond market in these 
terms. 
 Table 8 Domestic bond and Euro Yen bond issued by Japanese Companies 
Y 10 billion 
                  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Domestic bonds 
Euro yen bond 













Source; Culculated from Financial Market Trends (60) and Shouken Toukei Nenpou, 1994. 
  What we have tried to show in this section is why euro markets are 
preferred to raising yen, not to domestic markets . If Japanese companies 
preferred continuously to issue in the euro yen bond markets than domes-
tic bond markets, Japanese bond markets will be inevitable to fall into the 
hollowed out description. It is necessary to make a convenient market for 
resident and non-resident borrowers by putting Japanese bond market in 
order. It is certain that the euro market will continue to expand due to 
greater internationalization. Furthermore, investment and financing are
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becoming greater in the foreign markets. Accordingly, the problems 
which Japanese bond market need to solve are to try to create conditions 
similar to those found in the euro markets, and which correspond with 
greater internationalization. 
 To this end, on January 1995, Tokyo Stock Exchange(TSE) announced 
deregulations for the securities market. First of all, they improved the 
regulations relative to the listing for foreign companies as follows. 
 (a) TSE admits a listing application from such foreign companies even 
if their stock has not been listed on foreign stock exchange. 
 (b) TSE accepts a foreign applicant if the necessary financial docu-
ments are submitted, even though within a financial year they make a 
large merger. 
  (c) The usual guideline about the scale of listed companies has been 
repealed, and only eligibility criteria is applied as  follow  ; namely, 
shareholder's equity or net asset must be a minimum of 10 billion yen, and 
pre tax profits are a minimum of 2 billion yen for last 3 years. 
  (d) The new rule for dividend payments that have to paid for the latest 
financial year instead of 3 years is applied to foreign applicant. This rule 
does not apply to foreign applicant that is to be privatized. 
  (e) Applicants must maintain the liquidity of stocks and the number of 
shareholder must be a minimum of 1000 to enable them to keep such 
liquidity.* 
  (*For these see TSE Fact Book 1995, pp. 2 and 3 about the details of the rule)
 The Japanese Ministry of Finance also announced a relaxation relative 
to international bond trading, and introduced the all inclusive licence rule 
for issuing of euro yen bonds and Samurai bonds by non-resident, and 
equally to foreign bond issues by Japanese. This rules imply that those
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 entities were enabled to issue bond under licence at the beginning of it
s 
 financial year. These rules were applied on 1st April 1995 . Furthermore, 
 the Ministry of Finance allowed a primary sale of euro yen bond into 
 Japan by non-resident, including sovereign and its relatives from January 
 1996. 
   The Ministry of Finance also put into practice 4 points of deregulation 
 relating to bond markets to accord with the greater internationalizatio
n of 
 capital markets. Those points  are  ; first , to abolish a criterion for eligible 
bonds ; second, to establish satisfying disclosure rules ; third
, to admit the 
 issuing of bonds with warrants of "over-the -counter registered com -
 panies" ; fourth, to abolish the financial standard rule that should be
 satisfied for issues of bonds . The above amended rules come into effect on 
 1st January 1996.* 
   (* For the above rules in detail, see Junich Naito , "Tekisai Kijun no Kihonteki 
   Minaoshi ni Tsuite" Kousyasai Geppou , pp. 10 and 22, April 1995.)
  All those deregulations in Japan are aim to eliminate the hollowing out 
of the domestic capital markets by proceeding to liberalize and increase 
the efficiency of those markets. Of course , currently, it is an effective way 
to solve those problems. we consider that it is a necessary condition and a 
useful method. But the important thing in Japan is that the Japanese 
companies have to bring up individual shareholders and take a positive 
attitude to foster securities markets . Japanese companies thus far , if 
anything, did not pay much attention to the shareholders position . In the 
next section, we discuss the financial performance of Japanese companies 
in that content.
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 3 An assessment of Corporate Finance and the Capital 
   Market in Japan 
 Capital market is a main source for capital raising for corporate finan-
cial activities. To maintain an effective market for the listed stocks far 
more is needed than relaxing various rules. Here we discuss the present 
state of Japanese corporate finance in relation to the stock market. 
 Five years have passed already since stock market in Japan was de-
pressed. The probability of hollowing out will always be present and a lot 
of difficulty will arise in Japanese financial system from this change. The 
value of the stocks of the 1st listed on the TSE declined 178 trillion yen 
from March 1990 to March 1995. The recession of the stock market since 
January 1990 shook the Japanese companies that have depended on 
hidden financial income, like unrealized profits. Accordingly, it is impor-
tant to rebuilt the capital market to ensure an efficient capital allocation in 
the future. One method that has recently been tried is to stimulate a "mini 
stock market" and the market in over-the-counter registered companies. 
  The Ministry of Finance and Japan Securities Dealers Association decid-
ed to establish the "mini stock market" to enable investors to buy and sell 
stocks listed on the TSE with a minimum of one tenth of previous 
amounts of funds. This system is such that it enable to trades to be 
undertaken in small lots of 100 units. "Mini stocks" which are traded in the 
over-the-counter market are stocks of companies without listing on the 
stock exchange, and same price on the stock exchange is applied to stock 
on the "mini stock market". 
  Especially, an assignment of stock market in Japan was how to protect 
the flight from the market of individual stockholders. Also in Japan, 
minimum level for stock investment was high in comparison with Europe
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and United States of America. Mini amount for stock investment is 310 
thousand yen in America, 5 thousand yen in France , 35 thousand yen in 
Germany, 450 thousand yen in Great Britain . But in Japan, it is most high 
of 910 thousand yen(For these see Nihon Keizai newspaper , 19th April 1995). 
Japanese stock markets have always centered on the needs of corporate 
investors, and in addition , many listed stocks have cross holdings by 
corporate investors. Accordingly , Japanese stock market is not very acces-
sible for individual investors . 
  From July 1995, when the mini stock market was founded , Japanese 
investors will be able to invest to stocks with on average amounts under 
90 thousand yen. Individual investors are able to invest in high grade 
stocks with unit price of one tenth than before , and therefore, it is possible 
to call on funds from individual investors into the capital market . At the 
present, in Japanese stock markets, over-the-counter markets are strong-
ly expected to prosper for the middle scale companies in comparison 
with 1st listed markets which remain in depress . Developing over the-cou-
nter market provides a chance to raise funds for many middle scale 
companies. Therefore, it is now one of the main methods so as to recover 
the efficiency of markets by introducing competition between the 1st 
listed market and the over-the-counter market . 
 Some measures are exercised to recover the stagnant stock markets in 
Japan, in order to return individual stockholders to stock market . One of 
important thing is that Japanese companies have to improve their finan -
cial activities, such as stockholding structures , payout ratio and a rate of 
return on equities as compared with before , and that it makes stock 
markets able to anticipate increases of the rate of return on stocks . 
 Figure 2 describes the stockownership in all listed companies , and those 
have not changed. On March 1994, a rate of shareholding by financial
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            Source  : TSE, Fact Book 1995, p. 73. 
institutions and business corporations are 43.8 percent and 23.9 percent 
respectively. By contrast, individuals & others are 23.7 percent, as low as 
ever. Although a rate of shareholding in business corporations and finan-
cial institutions in total showed a slight decrease from 69.2 percent in 1992 
to 67.7 percent in 1994, it means that they sold out their stocks partly in 
order to obtain a hidden financial income. This is not to say that the 
mutual stockholding structures became greatly changed. It is necessary 
for the efficiency of stock market to abolish the tax on securities trading, 
to amend the double taxation of dividends and to cut down to the 
international level of corporate income tax. In addition to these, there 
should also be changed in the presentation of financial results by corn-
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panies. 
 Table 9 Business Results and 
         Listed Companies)
Distribution of Profits (All Non---Financial
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
 No. of Companies 
Total Liabilities & New Worth 




Amount of Cash Dividends 
Shareholders' Equity Ratio 
Ratio Before--Interest Current 
  Profits to Total Assets 
Ratio of After-tax Profits to 
  Shareholders' Equity (ROE) 
Ratio of Dividends to Shareholders' 














1,620 1,666 1,797 
250.2 282.8 340.3 
68.7 80.2 100.1 
10.0 12.6 14.6 
 5.7 5.9 7.1 
 4.5 5.8 7.1 
 1.7 1.9 2.2 
27.4 28.4 29.4 
 6.5 6.9 6.8 
 7.0 7.8 7.7 
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  1.8 
65.9
Source ; TSE, Fact Book 1995, p. 33,
 Table 9 explain the business results and distribution of profits . In this 
Table, Shareholders' Equity Ratio increased by 7.9 percent, as compared 
with ten years ago to record high of 31 .4 percent in 1994, because many 
Japanese companies have gathered a lot of equity capital by carrying out 
the equity financing, taking advantage of the opportunity of high stock 
prices during the bubble economy. However, on the contrary, Current 
Profits and After-Tax Profits have decreased in three consecutive years as 
many companies were affected by the decline of sales and the increase of 
fixed cost. Equipment investment and the consumers' demands have 
suffered from depression, and this affected company performance . And 
the Ratio of Before-Interest Current Profits to Total Assets , that is general 
profitability for the companies, decline to historical low of 3.94 percent. 
 In 1993, the Ratio of Current Profits to Equity and the Ratio of Return 
on Equity (ROE), calculated from this data, shows a decrease over five
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consecutive years. Moreover, Amount of Cash Dividends decreased to 2.2 
trillion yen in 1994. But Dividend Payout Ratio amounted to historical 
high of 65.86 percent, because many Japanese companies left dividends 
despite reduced profit margins. Dividend Payout Ratio has shown a declin-
ing trend in the year when profits increased as compared with previous 
years, but moved the other way in the year when profits decreased. 
 This is because Japanese companies in general trend to pay dividends 
with a certain fixed rate vis-a-vis the face value of a stock regardless of 
profit level. At present, such a custom of payment system is meaningless 
in recent times when market price remain at high levels. It must be noted 
that Japanese companies need to pay dividends according to their profit 
margin instead of on the face value of their stock. 
            Table 10 Price Earnings Ratio & Dividend Yields 
         Price Earnings RatioDividend Yields 
Year JAPAN USA UK GERMAN FRANCE JAPAN USA UK GERMAN FRANCE 
1990 39.8 11.66 10.10 12.6 9.3 0.64 3.75 5.73 3.78 3.98 
1991 37.8 15.91 17.25 15.1 12.7 0.70 2.89 4.84 3.80 3.69 
1992 36.7 15.24 21.74 14.3 15.8 0.93 2.87 4.27 4.01 3.60 
1993 64.9 15.20 30.66 29.1 27.5 0.82 2.71 3.64 2.88 2.69 
1994 79.5 12.70 17.81 62.2 24.5 0.74 2.89 4.43 3.26 3.32 
 Source  : Tokyo Stock Exchange, °Toushou Youran Fact Book", 1995. 
 As Table 10 also shows, the Japanese Price Earnings Ratio(PER) is high 
of 79.5 in comparison with other countries, and the conditions of high 
stock price is still continuing. As this ratio indicates how times the current 
stock price against earnings per stock is, those high levels in Japan makes 
it difficult for individual investors to enter the stock markets. 
 Furthermore, Japanese Dividend Yield is always less than 1 percent, low 
of 0.74 percent in 1994 in spite of other countries always being over 2 
percent. The dividend policy of Japanese companies tends to generalize 
the dividend level to that of the interest level since the stocks are issued at
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the market price rather than at par value . In those circumstances, it seems 
reasonable to say that, dividend which stockholders obtain is certainly the 
same to interest or less than it. 
 Moreover, as we consider that Japanese official discount rate is record 
low of 1 percent from January 1995, dividend yield in Japan as Table 10 
shows, is too low at under 1 percent . Japanese companies must recognize 
why stock investment has low attractions for individual investors , and 
what kind of dividend policy is suitable for the position of stockholders . 
  4 Conclusion
  We have discussed whether the Japanese capital markets suffer from 
the hollowing out in the international securities investments , and also, 
what are the implications of that for the financial policy of companies . 
  Corporate capital and funds always move into the efficient markets
seeking profitability. As we already noticed , the Japanese capital market is 
lossing its efficiency, and its attractions for stockholders , because of 
crossholding of stock and the financial behavior of companies , such as 
distribution of income. It is important . that, first, some regulations and 
rules have to be relaxed as found on the international and euro markets . In 
addition, it is desirable to ensure that individual investors are able to 
invest in securities with safety. 
 In those cases, it is very important programme in Japan to see how to 
improve the mutual stockholding between companies , and to promote the 
transition of stockownership to individuals . 
 Second, the Japanese companies must change their attitudes to individ-
ual stockholders concerning dividend policy , dividend payout ratio and 
other various ratios already described. Especially , in 1980s, the Japanese 
companies has been developed by using high stock price in the capital
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markets, which has given large companies a lot of hidden financial income 
or hidden assets. 
 After the bubble economy burst in 1990, Japanese companies are now 
troubled with debt finance because of raising funds by excessively equity 
financing. It is reason why companies are unable to convert debt raised 
into equity capital because of low stock price than before. Accordingly, a 
priority for Japanese companies is to improve their attitudes that depend 
on hidden financial income and its assets, and to establish effective capital 
markets for raising funds and investment.
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